Using HTTPS all over the place will make things better. See the following for details -> (this is a few years old, perhaps Tor is better at this now, anyone?) There are methods for increasing the probability that any given node (possibly an evil node) will be the exit node, which makes things worse. The biggest problem with Tor is the entry/exit node sees all your traffic and can potentially modify it unless otherwise protected (encrypted). I would argue against just using open APs, because even if you spoof your MAC, you can be placed in a particular location at a particular time, which is a worrying amount of information even if the precise connections can't be directly connected to your machine. If you want to prevent casual eavesdropping, Tor plus some application-layer encryption (e.g., SSL) is presumably adequate if you suspect you're being surveilled, you should combine it with other techniques such as open access points and routing through hacked servers.
It is presumably not impossible for attackers to break Tor's anonymity, and it is reasonable to expect that using Tor puts you under somewhat greater scrutiny than not, but there's (obviously) extremely little data about how much so. With very high probability, an organization that can watch both the entry and exit nodes in a circuit can correlate connections however, especially if these nodes are in different countries, this may be technically or politically infeasible.īottom line: with Tor, it is much more difficult for attackers to determine what you're doing, or whether something is being done by you.
It is believed that Tor is subject to a variety of attacks to break anonymity however, it is currently unclear how practicable any are. If you're transmitting sensitive or identifying data unencrypted, you're already choosing to be explicitly not anonymous if you do it over Tor, you're being not anonymous over an anonymizing network, somewhat defying the point. Exit nodes can see exactly what the server, and any eavesdroppers on an unanonymized connection, can see.
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